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Comparative Law of Privacy
James K. Weeks*
IN MANY SOCIET ES man is regarded as an acquisitive animal
who constantly struggles to protect his accumulated treas-
ures. In the Western world the pursuit of property is well-estab-
lished, philosophically, as well as in actual practice; but of even
greater importance though less well established is man's pursuit
of happiness, that rather nebulous entity which makes life worth
living.
That man should be allowed to develop his personality and
protect it from injury or public scrutiny, and keep it as free and
untrammeled as possible has been conceded by much of the free
world, at least in principle. In practice, however, frequently the
right has been conceded but in many areas this concession is the
beginning and the end of the matter. Particularly, this holds true
in the Anglo-American world when it has come to the matter of
judicially protecting this right of personality. Of course, where
the courts have found such a right existing in the form of a prop-
erty right they have been most willing to extend protection to
it in a collateral way.
Where privacy, which is the right of seclusion as to one's
name, person, or representation of self,1 is associated with an
action for libel or slander,2 copyright infringement,3 breach of
contract, trespass, 4 assault and battery, or similar type of action,
the Anglo-American courts seem perfectly willing as a gratuitous
bonus, to grant it protection. It is only where this right to se-
*Asst. Prof. of Law, Syracuse University College of Law.
1 Thayer, Legal Control of the Press 494 (4th ed. 1962).
2 Merle v. Sociological Research Film Corp., 166 App. Div. 376, 152 N. Y. S.
829 (1915) ; McNulty v. Reess Pub. Co., 136 Misc. 833, 241 N. Y. S. 29 (1930);
Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal, 262 N. Y. 99, 186 N. E. 217 (1933);
Dunlop Rubber Co., Ltd. v. Dunlop, (1921) 1 A. C. 367; Sports, etc. Agency,
Ltd. v. "Our Dogs" Publishing Co., (1916) 2 K. B. 880; Thorley v. Lord
Kerry (1812) 4 Taunt. 354; Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U. S. 185 (1908);
Morrison v. Smith, 177 N. Y. 366, 69 N. E. 725 (1904). This list is not in-
tended by any means to be exhaustive but is merely representative.
3 Hillman v. Star Publishing Co., 64 Wash. 691, 117 P. 594 (1911); Waring v.
WDAS, 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937), Gee v. Pritchard, (1818) 2 Swans.
403.
4 Cherrington v. Abney (1709), 2 Vern. 646; Hickman v. Maisey (1900), 1Q. B. 752; Harrison v. Duke of Rutland (1893), 1 Q. B. 142; Martin v. City
Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 63 S. Ct. 862 (1943). Again the list is intended to
be merely representative.
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clusion stands naked and alone that many Anglo-American
courts, and particularly the English, have encountered extreme
difficulty in bringing themselves to recognize such a right, and
allow a remedy for that alone. Admittedly, they will frequently
go to considerable extremes to find some plausible ground for de-
ciding in favor of the one whose right of seclusion has been vio-
lated. Why they cannot always decide upon the simple expedient
of recognizing a right of seclusion or privacy as such is not al-
ways clear, but the almost universal excuse appears to be an
inordinate fear of opening the gates to a flood of litigation. The
validity of this is, at best, questionable.
The right of privacy in the common law world did not re-
ceive any particular consideration in jurisprudence until 1890.
There previously had been cases involving something closely re-
sembling it, but these had always been decided on other grounds.
However, it was sometimes observed that a right to be left alone
was an adjunct of some other interest which enjoyed explicit legal
protection. 5 In fact, some courts, both English and American,
have always been prepared to state categorically that "no general
right of privacy exists." 6
In 1890 the problem of a right of privacy received special at-
tention, when the now famous Harvard Law Review article by
Messrs. Warren and Brandeis7 was published. In it the authors
surveyed many cases in which it appeared that the judges were
attempting to recognize and formulate such a right but gave it
protection only where it was attached to some regularly recog-
nized right. The gist of their article was that there existed a
right to be free from publicity, where one was not a public figure
or had not voluntarily placed himself in the public scrutiny. The
authors seemed to feel that the press was responding in an over
zealous manner to the public's voracious appetite for scandal and
gossip, and for what happened within the intimate family circle.
Privacy judicially recognized and protected is almost always an
attempt to curb excesses of the press.
5 Warren and Brandeis, Right of Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
6 Victoria Park Racing Club v. Taylor (1937), 58 C. L. R. 479, 496; in Yoeckel
v. Samonig, 272 Wis. 430, 75 N. W. 2d 925 (1956), the defendant, the operator
of a tavern, entered and photographed the plaintiff, a customer while she
was in the ladies' rest room, it was held that there had been no invasion
of privacy, as such a right did not exist in Wisconsin, and it was stated
that in any event the creation of such a right was a matter for the legis-
lature. Hillman v. Star Publishing Co., 64 Wash. 691, 117 P. 594 (1911);
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442 (1902).
But see Associate Judge Gray's dissent in Roberson case, supra.
7 Supra, n. 5.
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As previously mentioned, it is noteworthy that the legal pro-
tection of a right to seclusion, privacy, or the right to be let alone,
as it is variously known, is extended hesitatively and with con-
siderable mental reservation by the courts. The fact that no such
right was known at common law is the most frequently offered
excuse. This lack of precedent is an understandable excuse as
far as the common law, itself, is concerned, but to say there is no
precedent is to display a total disregard for history, and possibly
even English history in particular.
From the XII Tables of Roman Law onwards, portions of the
Western World have recognized a right of privacy and afforded
it legal protection. This view of the Roman Law has found its
way into the modern Civil Codes of the Continent albeit with
some difficulty in a few European countries.
Though the Romans probably settled most serious affronts
to their dignity by duels, their law did provide a remedy (actio
aestimatoria iniuriarium) for any act which showed contempt for
the personality of the victim. The basic recognition of moral in-
jury and a general law of personality (Personlichkeitsrecht) s
which had its inception in Roman law is found in many contem-
porary Civil Codes.
In the modern law a right of privacy may be explicit in the
Code itself or arise from the judicial interpretation of relevant
portions of a Code. The Civil Code of Argentina is an example of
the former, where Art. 1112 provides that:
If the act should constitute an offense under the criminal
law, the obligation arising therefrom comprises not only in-
demnity for damage, but also for the moral injury which the
offense may have caused the person to suffer, either by mo-
lesting him in his personal security, or in the enjoyment of
his property, or wounding his legitimate affections.9
The Swiss Civil Code 10 exemplifies the latter type of treat-
ment, and although it does not mention such a right per se, Swiss
8 The Codes of Switzerland, Turkey, Liechtenstein, Argentina, and the
pre-World War II codes of Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland.
9 Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana: The Materials For The Decision of
a Case, 17 Tulane L. Rev. 159, 179 (1942).
10 Article 49, Swiss Fed. Code of Obligations, and Art. 28, Swiss Civil
Code, the Obligationenrecht and Zivilgesetzbuch respectively. The author
of the article at n. 9, supra, indicates that Articles 41 and 42 of the Swiss
Federal Code of Obligations are the proper ones affording protection to
a right of privacy, since Article 41 in particular allows a remedy for acts
contra bonos mores, but the better authority indicates that Article 49 of
the same Code is more appropriate.
Sept., 1963
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writers have pointed out that certain portions of the Code are in-
tended to protect a right of privacy. The German Code also
makes a similar provision" to that of the Argentine Civil Code.
However, some question has arisen as to whether the German
Code envisages a protection of privacy per se.12 Probably much
the same question could arise in any European or Civil law
country from the lack of nominate torts, which are most familiar
to common law lawyers. 1
3
Some writers have marked the genesis of interest in the pro-
tection of personality with the development of eighteenth century
individualist philosophy, or the "Age of Philosophical Radical-
ism," as it has been called. Gierke in particular has been singled
out as the originator of the modern concern for the individual.
14
In fact, some writers would deny altogether any Roman origins
for protection of this facet of personality, and would date its birth
from sometime in the 18th century. One writer 15 went so far as
to claim that the theory that any unauthorized and wilful in-
trusion into the private life of another gave rise to a cause of
action had absolutely no counterpart in Roman Law. 16 Later in
the same article, however, he would grudgingly concede that per-
haps it was covered by the Roman actio aestimatoria iniuriarum,
but felt that, since this action required an "insult" as an essential
element, this emasculated its effectiveness insofar as concerned
invasion of privacy, and pertained instead to actions for defa-
mation.17
In this writer's opinion, such a view totally ignored the
Roman concept of delict and injuria, which were broad enough
to easily protect one against intrusions upon his private life.
Whether the Romans actually gave a remedy for such in practice,
will, of course, never be known with certainty, but it would ap-
pear in view of the high regard for the dignity of the person held
11 Article 826, German Civ. Code (Burgerliches Gesetzbuch). It should
be noted that all German cases involve pre-World War II situations and
no attempt has been made by this writer to determine the present sit-
uation in West Germany, but it is assumed that protection of such a
right is still recognized.
12 Gutteridge, Comparative Law of The Right of Privacy, 47. Law Q. Rev.
203, 206-209 (1931).
13 And see, Buckland, Textbook of Roman Law, 585 (2d ed. 1950).
14 Gierke, Deutsches Privatrecht, I. Sec. 203.
15 Gutteridge, op. cit. supra n. 12, at 204.
16 Ibid.
17 Buckland, op. cit. supra, n. 13.
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by the Romans, and the writings of their jurists that such a
remedy would not be altogether alien to them, and perhaps may
actually have been used.
The Modern Interest in Privacy-Anglo-American
In the modern world, outside of the Civilian systems, the
recognition and protection of a right of privacy has had a mud-
dled and uncertain development. In fact, in some areas it has
failed to develop at all, while in others the attempts to formulate
such a right have been abortive or have resulted in malformed
doctrines. Still in others, particularly certain jurisdictions within
the United States, the complexities of modern life have caused
the courts to recognize this right for reasons running the spec-
trum from dubious to the highly laudable one of protecting so-
ciety's interest in the self-rehabilitation of wrongdoers, as the
California court did in Melvin v. Reid. In this case a motion pic-
ture studio was prevented from further showings of a film based
upon incidents from the previous life of a self-reformed prosti-
tute, and the plaintiff was awarded damages for this invasion.
The trend in the United States, at least, is heavily in the direction
of recognizing that such a right exists.1 s
In England and throughout the Commonwealth the situation
is different. There the courts appear reluctant to recognize any-
thing remotely resembling a right of privacy as it is shown in
the majority of states of the United States which recognize it in
one way or another. 19 It may be noted that Justice Hugo Black
Is 41 Am. Jur. 927; 138 ALR 22; 168 ALR 446; 14 ALR 2d 750; C. J. S.
"Privacy," Sec. 1. See also: Restatement of Torts, Sec. 867.
19 The right is recognized in Ala., Alaska, Ariz., Ark., Calif. (where it was
first given recognition on a constitutional basis in Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal.
App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931), and later clearly recognized the right apart from
the California Constitution in Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 53 Cal. App. 2d
207, 127 P. 2d 577 (1942)); Conn., D. C., Colo., Fla., Ga., Ill., Ind., Ia., Kan.,
Ken., La., Mass., Mich., Mo., Mont., Nev., N. J., N. Y. (where it is gov-
erned by statute, Art. V, Sec. 50-51 Civil Rights Law, N. Y. Law 1909,
Consol. Laws c. 6, which established a right of privacy against the unau-
thorized use of a person's name, portrait or picture for purposes of trade
or advertising. This somewhat limits the right of privacy as defined by
N. Y. courts, although the law has shown some flexibility in meeting
varied situations; see: d'Altomonte v. N. Y. Herald Co., 133 Misc. 302, 231
NYS 445 DSTC); N. C., Ohio, Okla. (where it is also statutory, 21 Okla.
Stat. Ann. 839-840 (1950); Ore., Penn., Tenn., Va. (where it is a matter
of statute, Va. Code (1950) 8-650, "Unauthorized use of name of picture
for purposes of trade or advertising"); W. Va., Utah (where it is also
statutory, Utah Code Ann. 76-4-8, 76-4-9 (1953)); and S. C.
(Continued on next page)
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of the United States Supreme Court has expressed the opinion
recently (N. Y. Times, June 10, 1962) that libel and slander ac-
tions are unconstitutional as an infringement on Freedom of
Speech. If such a view were to gain recognition in the courts,
any discussion and further development of a right of privacy in
the United States would most likely become moot, since most
cases involving it, like the majority of libel and slander cases,
concern encroachments by the Fourth Estate. This is not to say
that protection of an individual's rights are absent, but they are
protected in English courts under the guise of ordinary actions
for defamation, trespass, breach of contract, or copyright in-
fringements. Invasions of privacy are regarded by English courts
as an "element of parasitic damages" which attach as a result of
an injury to some other legally protected interest.2 0 Where there
is no invasion of a property right or injury to reputation there
is no separate action in English courts,2 ' although numerous op-
portunities have presented themselves where recognition of the
right per se could have been accomplished.
In one of the more famous English cases, 22 which would
have lent itself ideally to a judicial recognition of a right of pri-
vacy, the court refused to recognize it. This case involved an
advertising cartoon depicting a famous English amateur golfer
praising the qualities of a certain chocolate candy. The cartoon
was accompanied by a doggerel verse, which standing alone
should have served as a basis for some type of action. The verse
read as follows:
The caddy to Tolley said, "Oh, Sir!
Good shot, sir, that ball see it go, Sir!
My word how it flies,
Like a cartet of Fry's,
They're handy, they're good and priced low, Sir! "23
(Continued from preceding page)
The right has been expressly denied in Wis. (Yoeckel v. Samonig, supra,
n. 6); Wash. (Hillman v. Star Pub. Co., 64 Wash. 691, 117 P. 594 (1911));
Rhode Island, (Henry v. Cherry Webb, 30 RI 13, 73 A. 97 (1909)); Texas;
and Nebr., (Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 161 Neb. 519, 73 NW 2d 803
(1955).
For a detailed survey of the law of privacy in the United States see:
Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383 (1960).
20 Gee v. Pritchard (1818), 2 Swan. 402; Thurston v. Charles (1905), 2 T. L.
R. 659.
21 Note, The Invasion of Privacy, 35 Austrl. L. J. 61 (Jul. 27, '61).
22 Tolley v. J. S. Fry & Sons, Ltd. [1930] 1 K. B. 467.
23 Id. at 468.
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The court held that the cartoon was defamatory inasmuch as it
was likely to affect the plaintiff's amateur standing and allowed
him to recover damages. It appeared that the judges in that case
recognized that the plaintiff had been injured more in his right of
privacy than in his reputation, but they extended defamation
considerably to afford him a remedy. As always, they searched
for some other legally recognized right on which to base their
decision. However, Lord Justice Greer indicated by obiter that
there ought to be a remedy against actions which were "incon-
sistent with the decencies of life." 24
The English courts have even gone to greater extremes to
give protection where they obviously recognize protection should
exist, and in consequence have bent the existing law considerably
in the process. It would appear that the far simpler expedient of
calling "a spade a spade" would afford greater protection and
give to other hesitant judges throughout the world the courage
to forge new paths into the apparent wilderness of privacy.
The extremes to which some judges, particularly the English,
seem willing to go to give something just short of actual recog-
nition of a right of privacy is illustrated by a relatively early
English decision in Gee v. Pritchard,2 5 where the Chancery
Court granted an injunction against the publication of letters by
the defendant, which had been written by the plaintiff but were
in the defendant's custody. The court was very careful, how-
ever, to find a property right in the plaintiff before enjoining
the publication, but the Lord Chancellor did seem to indicate
that some explanation or defense of his decision was necessary
when he stated:
I do not say that I am to interfere because the letters are
written in confidence, or because the publication of them
may wound the feelings of the plaintiff; but if mischievous
effects of that kind can be apprehended in cases in which
this Court has been accustomed, on the ground of property,
to forbid publication, it would not become me to abandon
the jurisdiction....26
Again one finds the tendency, almost amounting to an ob-
session, to call a right of privacy anything else but what it is,
and to find a reasonably safe ground upon which to place the
24 Id. at 478.
25 (1818) 2 Swans. 403.
26 Supra, n. 25, at 413.
Sept., 1963
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decision. This concern with finding a property right instead of a
right of personality is not peculiar to the English judges alone.
In fact, this device was, and still is, used by American judges in
those jurisdictions where the issue of a right of privacy has been
brought before a court which finds itself unable, for one reason
or another, to recognize the right per se. Similar occurrences
have marked the development of the right on the Continent, par-
ticularly in France.27
Certainly in one area of the world, India, influenced to a
high degree by English and American law, and principally the
former, a legal right of privacy was afforded judicial recognition
and protection as early as 188828 (two years before the Warren
and Brandeis article). However, this was accomplished by first
recognizing that certain peoples have customarily recognized
privacy, and then applying this custom to the judicial decision.
Why something as sacrosanct as the natural right, inherent in
Western philosophy, to be let alone, under most circumstances,
did not have an early influence upon all English and American
courts, and thereby gain judicial recognition, as did the Hindu
and Muslim custom of privacy as regards parda-nashin women,
in Gokal Parasad v. Radho, is not certain, except for the usual
excuses of a lack of precedent and the fear of many vexatious
suits following in the wake of recognition. This latter excuse has
found little justification in view of the experience in those juris-
dictions which have recognized the right.
In the Radho case, an English court in India showed an ap-
parent willingness to recognize a right of privacy, particularly
where such a right was indigenous to the custom and background
of the litigants. The court stated:
In my opinion, the fact that there is no such custom of
privacy known to the law of England can have no bearing
on the question whether there can be in India a usage or
custom of privacy valid in law. I can see nothing unreason-
able in a custom that such privacy shall be protected.29
In spite of the fact that this particular judge considered it
extremely "reasonable" to recognize a right of privacy, par-
ticularly where a customary tradition for its enjoyment exists,
27 Walton, The French Law as to the Right of Privacy, 47 Law Q. Rev.
219 (1931).
28 Gokal Prasad v. Radho (1888), In. L. R., 10 Alla. 358.
29 Id. at 385.
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his counterparts on the bench in England, then and now, have
failed to appreciate the virtue of this "reasonableness."
As recently as 196030 the English courts were again pre-
sented with the opportunity to recognize the right once and for
all, and again failed to face the situation directly, preferring in-
stead to seek some circuitous route to the decision. In this ac-
tion the plaintiff's husband accused the defendant of breach of
copyright in giving the plaintiff's wedding photographs to two
newspapers. These newspapers, the Daily Express and the Daily
Mail, used them to illustrate articles concerning the murder of
the plaintiff's father. The publication of these photographs
caused the plaintiff's wife considerable anguish and suffering.
The court awarded damages for the breach of copyright, and
then came closer to recognizing the right of privacy per se than
had any other previous English court; for it allowed the plain-
tiff to recover exemplary damages because of the "scandalous"
and "flagrant infringement" of his copyright by the defendant.
Lord Justice Sellers felt that in addition the defendant showed
a total disregard for the plaintiff's feelings and "sense of family
dignity and pride." 31 He further stated:
It was an intrusion into his life, deeper and graver than
an intrusion into a man's property.3 2
Here, the final separation of personality and property in
English law could have been made, but again at the gates, the
judges faltered and finally retreated, missing what would have
been the proper place at which to drive the stake through the
heart of this monster, which the English judges appear to fear,
when they consistently refuse to give full recognition to a right
of privacy, unencumbered and unadorned with the trappings of
other legal rights.
Incidentally, there is not a total absence of precedent in Eng-
lish decisions for the development of new causes of action, par-
ticularly in the area of tort, a fact to which the history of the
common law amply attests. 33
It appears to be only by historical accident that the action
on the case was not developed to include protection of a right of
30 Williams v. Settle (1960), 1 W. L. R. 1072, 2 All E. R. 806 C. A.
31 Id. at 1082.
32 Ibid.
33 Wilkinson v. Downton (1897), 2 Q. B. 57, Janvier v. Sweeney (1919), 2
K. B. 316; 8 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 352 (1955).
Sept., 1963
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privacy. An action for insult had been recognized in the Anglo-
Saxon law and in the Teutonic tribal law,3 4 but not in the medi-
eval common law, which left this to the jurisdiction of the ec-
clesiastical courts. Perhaps a modern English judge with an at-
titude similar to the one exhibited by the judge in the case in-
volving the parda-nashin women, could do much with the ancient
basis that the Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic tribal law provided.
When the action on the case began to develop in the common
law courts, the way was clear for the recognition and protection
of a right of privacy by simply making the gist of the action
the insult rather than the damage, but unfortunately for a right
of privacy, the latter course prevailed.35
One writer 6 has suggested that English courts could, if they
wished to participate in this evolution of a legally protected right
of privacy, do so by an awakening of the tort of "wilfully doing
an act calculated to cause physical harm." This suggestion, how-
ever, seems inadequate from its inception, for in a majority of
the privacy cases there is no physical harm but merely incon-
venience, discomfort, and anxiety to the victim. It was for this
reason that many American jurisdictions quickly saw the neces-
sity of creating a new cause of action because defamation and
the like were not broad enough to suffice.
The English Press has displayed an increasing inclination to
pry into the personal affairs of many individuals. Two such oc-
casions where the Press has done so were in the case of the
English soccer team, whose members were seriously injured in
a plane crash in Munich (the press invading the hospital with-
out authorization in order to get photographs), and in the un-
warranted intrusions by the press upon the bereaved family of a
young Dutch girl who had been murdered while on a holiday
trip to England. Accordingly there has been agitation for reme-
dial legislation. One such attempt was the introduction of a
private Bill before the House of Lords, The Right of Privacy
Bill (1961), which sought to protect every individual against in-
vasions of his privacy consistent with the public's right to be
kept informed on matters in which they are reasonably con-
cerned.
34 Holdsworth, op. cit., supra, n. 33, at 334-335.
35 Ibid. See also: Pollock, Torts 324 (12th ed., 1962).
86 Dworkin, Privacy and the Press, 24 Mod. L. Rev. 188 (1961).
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One of the proponents of the Bill, Lord Denning, stated
during debate on the proposal that:
If the law of England gives no remedy for an infringe-
ment of privacy then it becomes a duty at once to imple-
ment some Bill to put it right.37
The proposed Right of Privacy Bill was sponsored by Lord
Mancroft and was designed to "strike a balance between the
essential freedom of the Press and the equally essential rights of
the individual." Consistent with the decisions of many American
jurisdictions, which recognized the right of privacy, the Bill ex-
cepted certain individuals from protection under it (obvious pub-
lic figures; persons who voluntarily seek publicity; and those
who because of the occurrence of some public event have had
publicity thrust upon them.)
As would be expected, Lord Mancroft drew heavily upon
American development of this doctrine as the authority for his
proposal, and the ubiquitous Warren-Brandeis article was cited
frequently. Little attention was paid to Continental develop-
ments in this area with the exception of a passing, but unde-
tailed, comment that West Germany had by law made the un-
consented disclosure of information concerning a person's private
affairs actionable, unless justified in the public interest.
In spite of considerable desire in many quarters for the pass-
age of such legislation, the proposed Bill failed to pass, largely
because of strong Press opposition, which had been evident
whenever proposals for closer scrutiny of the Press, in one form
or another, had been made.3s
In 1949 the Royal Commission on the Press studied the prob-
lem and found that protecting individuals from the intrusions of
the Press would be extremely difficult to achieve through legis-
lation, which in all probability would be ineffective and incapable
of enforcement in any event. 39
However, in South Africa, a former member of the British
Commonwealth, the courts appear to be moving toward recogni-
tion of a right of privacy (through definition of injuria) ignoring
the element of insult which others have felt to be the gist of the
37 Parliamentary Debates (1960-61), Vol. 229, Feb. 28-Mar. 23, 607, 615.
38 Supra n. 36 at 189. An example of this was the strong Press opposition
to the Tucker Commission in 1958.
89 Ibid.
Sept., 1963
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action. In the two relatively recent South African decisions,40
it was held that the unauthorized use and publication of a per-
son's picture is capable of being an independent tort.
So here the citadel of non-recognition, in English courts,
stands apparently unchanged and largely undamaged by the few
ineffectual assaults which have been made upon it in the courts
and legislative bodies. It apparently remains for the English, as
the most likely recourse, to find reasonable extensions of exist-
ing actions to implement and protect against invasions of pri-
vacy.4 1
Up to now the subject has received very little treatment in
English legal periodicals or law texts, and even less in reported
decisions.4 2
Continental Recognition of Privacy-France
The French have apparently allowed a right of action for
violations of privacy. In a manner somewhat contradicting Prof.
Higgins' observation, in "My Fair Lady": "that the French don't
care what they do actually so long as they pronounce it cor-
rectly," the French courts have been careful to find that the
defendant's fault has been proved,43 but have failed to assign a
particular title to this cause of action in keeping with their prac-
tice of not having nominate torts. Once the French are satis-
fied that fault on the part of the defendant has been proved they
next determine if it has caused damage to the plaintiff, and if
so, they allow damages, as well as injunctive relief in some cases.
40 O'Keefe v. Argus Printing and Publishing Co., Ltd. (1954) (3) S. A. 244;
Kidson v. S. A. Associated Newspapers, Ltd. (1957) (3) S. A. 461.
41 Buckland, op. cit. supra n. 13 at 585.
42 Apparently the only English legal periodical articles treating this sub-
ject to date have been the Winfield, Walton and Gutteridge articles in 47
Law Q. Rev. 23, 219, 203 (1931), and the article in 24 Mod. L. Rev. 188
(1961). Except for the brief note in 35 Austrl. L. J. 61, there has not been
any treatment of the subject in Commonwealth legal journals. Even Flem-
ing, The Law of Torts (2d ed. 1961), one of the latest English law texts
on torts, gives only six pages (563-569) to the topic, and ends by remarking
that the prospect of making the right of privacy a nominate tort in English
law is not hopeful. See also: 25 Mod. L. Rev. 393 (1962); Brittan, The Right
of Privacy in England and the United States, 37 Tulane L. Rev. 235 (Feb.
1963).
43 Walton, supra n. 36, at 220. The French theory of "Fault" is contained
in Articles 1382-1383 of the French Civil Code. Art. 1382 provides that:
"Every act whatever of man which causes damage to another obliges him
by whose fault it happened to repair it." The basis for a pecuniary re-
covery for violations of a right of privacy in French law is the "moral
damage" caused the plaintiff.
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Not unlike judges in other countries, the French judges have
often resorted to associating a right of privacy with some other
property right, but appear to be willing to accept in essence the
idea of privacy as existing as an independent right.44
The majority of the French cases, that this writer was able
to find, dealt principally with the unauthorized use of a photo-
graph or the unauthorized appropriation of a surname. In one
of the early cause cdl~bres in this area 4" the judge remarked
that:
The French law guarantees to every human being the
complete sum of liberty compatible with the necessities of
social life. . . (T)his right includes assuredly the right to
withdraw one's countenance from the public view. . . (T) o
reproduce, exhibit or sell the photograph of a person against
his will is an invasion of liberty. 46
Another of the earliest French cases47 to involve directly
the matter of affording protection against invasions of privacy
was brought by Alfred Dreyfus, who was to gain everlasting
fame as the central figure in an espionage case in which he was
the victim of religious bigotry and political intrigue. In this
case, however, his name had been listed in a directory of all Jews
in France, which had been compiled by the defendant. The Civil
Tribunal of Lyons held, that not only did the plaintiff have a
property right in his name, but secondly, and more important
from the standpoint of the development of a right of privacy, that
he was to be protected against "indiscreet publicity" as to his
political and religious beliefs.
One writer on the French developments in the area of pri-
vacy 4s feels that the greatest strides have been in those cases
which involved unauthorized publication, in one form or another,
of portraits and photographs.
In Whistler v. Eden,49 the painter had contracted to do a
portrait of Lady Eden, but upon completion of the painting re-
fused to deliver it, and instead exhibited it in a public art gallery.
44 Ibid.
45 Vin Mariani Case, Trib. civ. de la Seine, 20 janvier 1899, Dall. Per. 1902,
2, 73. Paris, 3 janvier 1908, Dall. Per. 1908, 2, 292.
46 Paris, 3 janvier 1908, Dali. Per. 1908, 2, 292.
47 Trib. Civ. de Lyon, 15 dee. 1896. Dall. Per. 97, 2, 174.
48 Supra n. 50, at 225.
49 Civ. 14 mars 1900, Dall. Per. 1900, 1, 497.
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Subsequently he completely painted over the face of Lady Eden
and placed a new face on the canvas. In rendering the judgment,
the court treated both the right of privacy of the painter and
the painted. In respect to the former, the court held that he had
the right to withhold his work and pay damages for breach of
contract, which constituted his right of privacy; and that the
latter individual, who was represented by the painting, had the
right to demand that it not be reproduced by the artist nor shown
in its "recognizable form."
Where the right of privacy is invaded through the unau-
thorized use of photographs the French have developed a large
body of law.50 This jurisprudence is, perhaps, best summed up
by one English writer who treated the subject, when he stated:
The following propositions, may, I think, be considered
as settled law: -
(1) The photographer is, apart from stipulations to the
contrary, the owner of the photograph.
(2) But the photographer cannot without the authori-
zation, express or implied, of the person portrayed repro-
duce the photograph or expose it to the public.
(3) The authorization must be given by a capable per-
son. So, in the case of a photograph of a minor child the
father must consent.
(4) The authorization of the person represented may be
inferred from circumstances.
(5) But such authorization is not implied from the fact
that the sitter asked for or accepted a reduction of price.
(6) Nor even from the fact that the artist made the
portrait gratuitously, though this in connexion with other
facts may lead to the conclusion that the authorization was
granted.
(7) The authorization is implied when a person in the
public street voluntarily allows his portrait to be taken.
(8) When a photograph of a person has been taken
without his consent and it represents him in surroundings
or in such a way as to be calculated to affect his reputation
injuriously or to make him ridiculous, a claim of damages
will lie.5 '
American developments in this same area have closely
paralleled that of the French although coming somewhat later
50 Supra n. 50, at 225.
51 Ibid.
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in point of time.5 2 Both the English and American courts5 3 differ
from the view set forth in (1), and hold that the person photo-
graphed and not the photographer is the exclusive owner of the
picture.54 Proposition (2) is followed in most American juris-
dictions,3 5 as are (3), 5 1 (4), 57 (7), 58 and (8). 59 There do not
appear to be any American cases in point on propositions (5)
and (6), although it appears that there is some authority for
the proposition that other circumstances may be shown for the
purpose of implying consent.60
Both the French and many of the American courts appear
satisfied that there is no invasion of privacy where the person
portrayed is a public figure 6 ' or the picture is used in connection
with some event of public concern and interest.
2
Most of the French cases have involved the publication of
photographs which defamed the plaintiff, and have not treated
the situation where the publication was a mere invasion of
privacy.63 Most of the American cases in this area have been
suits for defamation rather than privacy.
In France, there is no reason for denying a privacy action,
and the absence of specific law on this point is the result of the
52 Specific French citations have been omitted. Anyone interested in read-
ing the specific case for each point (1)- (8) is directed to the Walton article
cited at n. 27, supra.
53 Thayer, op. cit., supra, n. 1, 492, et seq.
54 Pollard v. Photographic Co. (1888), 58 L. J. Ch. 251, 40 L. R. Ch. Div.
345; White Studio Inc. v. Dreyfoos, 156 App. Div. 762, 142 NYS 37 (1913).
55 Ibid. See also: Corliss v. E. W. Walker Co., 57 F. 434, 31 LRA 283 (Cir.
Ct. D. Mass., 1893); Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 SW 364
(1909); Almind v. Sea Beach Co., 157 App. Div. 230, 141 NYS 842 (1913);
Kunz v. Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 177 P. 532; McNulty v. Press Publ. Co., supra
n. 2; Young v. Greneker, 175 Misc. 1027, 26 NYS 2d 357 (1941) (a manikin
of a living person held to be a portrait and hence protected under the N. Y.
Civil Rights Law); Cf. Kunz v. Bosselman, 131 App. Div. 288, 115 NYS 650(1909).
56 Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257, 155 S. E. 194 (1930).
57 Freed v. Loew's, Inc., 175 Misc. 616, 24 N. Y. S. 679 (1940).
58 Blumenthal v. Picture Classics, 235 App. Div. 570, 257 NYS 800 (1932);
Binns v. Vitagraph Co., 210 N. Y. 51, 103 N. E. 1108 (1913).
59 Metzger v. Dell Publishing Co., 207 Misc. 182, 136 NYS 2d 888 (1955).
60 Themo v. New England Newspaper Pub. Co., 306 Mass. 54, 27 N. E. 2d
753 (1940).
61 Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corp., 108 Cal. App. 2d 191, 238 P. 2d 670
(1951); Sidis v. F-R Pub. Co., 113 F. 2d 806 (C. C. A. 2, 1940).
62 Supra n. 50, at 228. See also: Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18
S. W. 2d 972 (1929); Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304,
95 P. 2d 491 (1939).
63 Supra n. 43, at 227.
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fact that no such cases have presented themselves to the French
courts.
4
The proper basis for such an action in the French courts
would be Article 1382 of the French Civil Code. Some observers
are inclined to lay the basis for this right in the general category
of Abuse of Right, but, in this writer's opinion, this would be
extending that concept beyond its normal limits.65 The Abuse
of Right presupposes that the individual is acting within the
limits of his legal rights but so conducting himself that his ac-
tions are contrary to what would be normally regarded as per-
missible use of them. The better view would incline towards the
theory that where one purposely and intentionally invades the
privacy of another, and no justification for this can be shown,
that no right in fact exists for this invasion; it is this lack of
right which gives rise to a cause of action. Although it is not
certain, it would appear that a Frenchman desirous of vindicating
his right of privacy would be well advised to proceed under
Article 1382. It would be accurate to say that since the action
arises more from a lack of right than an abuse of one, the liability
must be grounded on the broad concept of fault which is the
foundation of Art. 1382.
Germany
In Germany the protection of privacy has been accorded
judicial recognition but it is rather difficult to say exactly where
the foundation for it lies. The Germans frequently protect this
right under the heading of defamation, copyright infringement,
or where there is another proprietory right, but at the same
time recognizing privacy as something separate.
The German Civil Code contains several articles which are
relevant to a discussion of the development of a right of privacy.
Article 823 of the Burgerliches Gesetzbuch is the basis for
tort law in Germany and provides that any act done wilfully or
negligently which infringes upon certain enumerated rights is
unlawful. These rights include "the right to liberty" and "the
right to property," and most importantly, "any similar right." It
is this latter provision which may be intended to afford protec-
tion to privacy. Critics of this proposition have pointed out that
64 Id. at 228.
65 This would appear to be consistent with the view expressed by Planiol,
Civil Law Treatise, Pt. 1, Sec. 872-pp. 480-485 (1939).
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this Article was intended to protect only proprietary rights. 6 If
that is true, another basis for such a right can be found in Article
226,6 7 which provides a remedy where a right has been exer-
cised for no other purpose than to inflict harm on another. How-
ever, it is in Article 826 that an incipient right of privacy clearly
appears.
Article 826 forbids injuring anyone contra bonos mores, and
this would most certainly be applicable to unwarranted intru-
sions into the private life of another. In several German cases
this Article was the basis for a judgment for the plaintiff whose
privacy had been invaded.""
In the Donner Case,0 9 the defendants were enjoined from
exhibiting a film which represented a family tragedy, on the
grounds that its showing constituted a moral injury.
As in many modem nations the intrusions upon the se-
clusion of a person frequently take the form of advertisements
involving the use of the plaintiff's name or likeness.70 In a
famous case involving the use of Count Zeppelin's name on a
brand of cigarettes and cigars,7 1 the German court held that this
unauthorized use constituted a moral injury, as well as, an in-
jury to his reputation. Although the court did grant an injunc-
tion it would not allow damages.
Without doubt the German law has kept pace with American
developments in this area, and is certainly much ahead of cur-
rent English attitudes toward protection of privacy. It is, how-
ever, somewhat behind other areas on the Continent. This is
the result of uncertainty as to what specific portions of the Ger-
man Civil Code are pertinent, and a certain reluctance on the
part of German judges to extend their interpretations of Article
826. Nevertheless, the Germans seem to recognize such a right
in substance if not in theory.
66 Gutteridge, supra, n. 12 at 206.
67 Art. 226 BGB, was intended to cover all rights and would render illicit
all rights when used for the purpose of harming one. This interpretation
clearly goes much beyond the French definition of Abuse of Right; and
probably as Planiol (see n. 65, supra) points out is difficult to apply and
appears to be in conflict with Art. 823, BGB.
68 Nietzsche Case, R. G. E. Vol. 69, 403; 0. L. G. Wien, Nov. 17, 1928.
69 71 Juristische Wochenschrift (1930).
70 Gutteridge, supra n. 12, at 209.
71 74 R. G. E. 311.
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Switzerland
In the Swiss Civil Code, perhaps the most sophisticated of
the modern European Codes, the protection of privacy depends
upon the implementation of the Code with certain provisions of
the Code of Obligations. The relevant portions of the respective
Codes are Article 28 of the Swiss Civil Code, which provides for
injunctive relief against unauthorized acts which injure a per-
son in his personal relations, and in some instances the payment
of money damages; and Article 49 of the Code of Obligations.
This latter Article is utilized to implement Article 28 of the Swiss
Code, and it provides that:
Where anyone is injured in his personal relations owing
to the wilful or negligent act of some other person he is en-
titled to compensation in respect to pecuniary loss, and
where this is justified by the exceptional gravity of the in-
jury or due to a wilful or negligent act, he may also claim
payment of a sum of money by way of moral damages. The
judge may, however, decree some other kind of reparation
to be made either in place of or in addition to the award of
money by way of moral damages.
Certainly, this provision of the Code of Obligations does much
to enlarge what would otherwise be the fairly restrictive pro-
vision of the Swiss Code, which gives injunctive relief solely,
except in very special circumstances, in cases involving in-
vasions of privacy.
Another possible basis for founding a cause of action in
privacy cases can be found in the Swiss Code under the pro-
vision which provides a remedy for one injured by some act
which is contra bonos mores.7 2 The better view, however, in-
dicates that the proper basis for extending judicial protection
to privacy is Article 28 of the Swiss Code as implemented by
Article 49 of the Code of Obligations.
Fairly recently the problem of recognizing and protecting
a right of privacy has been discussed in the Scandinavian
countries. 73 However, this writer was unable to determine the
extent to which this right is recognized or for how long, if at
all, it has received judicial protection.
It should be noted that the recognition and protection of a
right of privacy on the Continent has been due, largely, to the
Reception of Roman Law into this area, which through the de-
72 Swiss Code of Obligations (Obligationenrecht) Art. 41 (2).
73 Andenaes, J., Privatlivets Fred, Norsk Rikskringkasting (1958).
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lict of injuria has provided an adequate basis for the recognition
of such a right. In addition to the injuria delict the concept of
Personlichkeitsrecht, and the idea of a tort contra bonos mores
have done much to place a person's privacy on a high plane of
judicial protection throughout most of the Continent.
Summary
It would appear that although ancient precedent would
support the recognition of a right of privacy, much of the West-
ern World has been somewhat slow in according it full stature
as a right, particularly in England and much of the British Com-
monwealth.
On the Continent the development and recognition of this
right has frequently taken place under the title of a copyright
infringement or an act involving moral injury. Even though it
is often treated with other actions, the right of privacy, itself,
has a distinctive quality of separateness, and is not considered
"parasitic" as it is in England.
The most common difficulty in tracing the development of
the right of privacy in other than the Anglo-American legal
world, apart from a language barrier, is the failure of Con-
tinental countries to give it a specific title. One reason for the
nebulous aura surrounding the right of privacy on the Con-
tinent, insofar as precise nomenclature is concerned, is the pre-
vailing practice of the Civilian system to avoid categorizing
legal rights and duties or civil wrongs, thereby avoiding many
of the problems of a semantic nature encountered in the Anglo-
American system. This attitude of the former system may give
considerable flexibility to the administration of justice but al-
lows little latitude for the indulgence of a penchant for strict
terminology. The lack of a proper name for the right of privacy
on the Continent does not prevent judicial protection of an in-
dividual's private life where the intrusions are of such a nature
as to prevent a defamation or other ordinary action from being
successful.
Jurisprudence which is guided by broad general prin-
ciples, and not reduced to "pigeon-holing" causes of action,
provides a more fertile field for the growth of rights, par-
ticularly privacy, which has a rather neuter quality as far as
the law is concerned though it may be quite real to an in-
dividual. The right of privacy appears to elude attempts at
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strict classification ("pigeon-holing") cutting, as it does, across
and into many areas of legal classification, but frequently fall-
ing short of the quantum required to place it in a particular
category of established rights.
Where the right of privacy has been recognized in some
American jurisdictions, particularly New York, Oklahoma,
Utah and Virginia, and has been given effect by statute but
limited in its scope to unauthorized appropriation of personality
for trade and advertising purposes, one can hardly resist com-
menting on the relative unimportance given to lofty social
values by these states, which have reduced a right of privacy
to a base value of the market-place. This right should tran-
scend the market place and be placed in its proper perspective
within the class of the great constitutional rights to which it
belongs, being as it is, an essential of liberty.
In one of the earliest and landmark American cases estab-
lishing a right of privacy, the Supreme Court of Georgia in
Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co.,7 4 properly stated
the high position a right of privacy should occupy when it
said that:
When the law guarantees to one the right to the en-
joyment of his life, it gives to him something more than
the mere right to breathe and exist.
At this time there is little doubt that the right of privacy
is well established in most American jurisdictions. In Europe
the situation is much the same. There the concept of "Fault"
and "Moral Injury" affords the proper climate for its further
development and continued protection. The fact that Continen-
tal countries have difficulty in tacking down the concept to a
particular category of right, and even, sometimes, to a par-
ticular article in their Code, is, after all, inconsequential.
Only in England is the right slow to come into its own, but
the increasing awareness of the English Bench and Bar that
there should be such a right would appear to be the harbinger
for future recognition and protection. However, due to a cer-
tain traditional reluctance on the part of the English judges to
blaze new trails in this area, it is more likely that the first
breakthrough of this right will come from Parliament.
74 122 Ga. 190, 195, 50 S. E. 68 (1905).
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